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Is There a ‘Dispositional Modality’? 
Maine de Biran and Ravaisson on Agency and 
Inclination
Within the contemporary metaphysics of powers or dispositions, it is often 
remarked that  ‘power’  is  not,  in  fact,  synonymous with  ‘disposition’.  A 
power is a capacity or ability, such as the salt’s capacity to dissolve in 
water, the bridge’s capacity to bear a load or my ability to drive a car. A 
disposition,  however,  can  mean more  than a  mere  ability  or  capacity, 
particularly when we speak of being disposed to do something, and this in 
the sense of having a tendency, propensity or a ‘proneness’ to do it. I may 
have an ability to do a particular thing, I may even have honed a skill in 
doing it, but this does not entail that I am disposed to do it, i.e. that I have 
the  tendency  or  inclination  to  do  it.  A  tendency  or  inclination  to  do 
something does not merely facilitate that action, as does a capacity, but is 
rather, it would seem, a veritable principle of action, something that can 
lead me to act even in advance of voluntary decision, and that possesses 
a drive to realise itself.
Our  ordinary  intuitions  and  language,  then,  seem  difference  a 
disposition in particular from power in general. Nevertheless, accounting 
philosophically for this difference is not straightforward. Within the domain 
of  psychological  powers,  it  is  not  obvious  how  to  avoid  reducing  a 
tendency or inclination to the status of an efficient cause – a cause of an 
event that is no longer, in the narrow sense of the term, an action. In a 
related sense, we might consider that a tendency or inclination is a power 
whose manifestation does not, in any circumstances, have to occur, but it 
is not clear how we could account for this non-necessitation without falling 
back into the idea that the manifestation is simply possible. In relation to 
this  question  of  the  modal  status  of  dispositions,  however,  a  recent 
argument advanced by Stephen Mumford and Rani Lil Anjum is of great 
import. For in their 2011 Getting Causes from Powers1 they argue that: 1) 
dispositions, as tendencies or inclinations, have a modal status irreducible 
to more familiar notions of necessity or possibility, and 2) that we have a 
1 Steven Mumford and Rani Lil Anjum, Getting Causes from Powers (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011).
direct experience of this sui generis modality in our experience of agency. 
What they call the ‘dispositional modality’ is, they contend, in some sense 
a phenomenological datum, and this contention serves, in fact, to support 
a general theory of powers: all powers, and not just psychological powers 
are a function of tendency, of being-disposed or being-inclined. ‘Power’ 
and  ‘disposition’  are,  on  this  account,  synonymous,  because  the 
tendential  quality  ascribed to  dispositions  in  the  narrow sense already 
characterises powers in general. This is to say that our ordinary intuitions 
concerning the difference between powers as capacities, on the one hand, 
and tendencies or inclinations, on the other, would register a difference of 
degree and not in kind.
In  what  follows  I  respond  to  Mumford  and  Anjum’s  claims  with 
reference  to  two  19th-century  philosophers  seldom  studied  in  the 
Anglophone  world  but  no  less  pivotal  in  the  development  of  French 
philosophy:  Pierre  Maine  de  Biran  and  Félix  Ravaisson.  Mumford  and 
Anjum are aware that their claims have precedents in the philosophical 
tradition,  but the work of  both French philosophers, whom they do not 
mention, 2 allows us both to criticise and to develop their claims. Maine de 
Biran, I contend, allows us to see how the appeal to voluntary agency in 
Getting Causes from Powers is unconvincing and ultimately illegitimate, 
whilst  Ravaisson’s  account  –  in  his  1838  De  l’habitude  – of  agency 
becoming, in the acquisition of a habit, a function of inclination, provides 
one way of thinking what is required if  we are to justify and cash out 
Mumford  and  Anjum’s  interesting  ideas  concerning  the  modality  of 
dispositions. I first examine these ideas in situ before turning to Maine de 
Biran and then Ravaisson.
1. The ‘Dispositional Modality’
2 Mumford and Anjum mention neither French philosopher, but they do have a 
faint link to them: they acknowledge (Getting Causes from Powers, ix) that their 
ideas concerning the dispositional modality, i.e. of tendency or inclination owe 
much to A. N. Whitehead, whose ideas in this regard were influenced by Henri 
Bergson, who, in turn, was profoundly influenced by Ravaisson.
Mumford and Anjum remark – at the risk of confusion – that they use the 
term disposition in a “non-tendential sense”,3 which is to say that their 
account  of  tendency  or  being-disposed  is  supposed  to  characterise  all 
powers as such, and not just a narrow subset of them. All powers have “an 
irreducible sui generis modality … something between pure necessity and 
pure contingency and that is reducible to neither”. Powers in general tend 
towards  their  manifestations  without  necessitating  them;  and  although 
“the idea of something irreducibly tending towards certain outcomes has 
not attracted many adherents in modern philosophy … it is … the core 
modal  notion”.  This  idea  may  not  have  attracted  many  adherents  in 
modern philosophy, but it has prominent advocates in Medieval and Early 
Modern  Philosophy,  and  thus  Mumford  and  Anjum  admit  that  their 
“innovation” is more like “the reassertion of a very old innovation”.4
Getting  Causes  from  Powers presents  this  ‘innovation’  within  the 
framework of  an  account  of  causation  according to  a  realist  theory  of 
powers: powers only incline towards their manifestations, which means 
that  in  causation there is  something other than necessitation at  work. 
Now, a particular causal process, such as my striking the match on the 
box to light it, can be prevented by other, external factors, such as rain. In 
any process, power A could be present, but its typical production of effect 
3 Getting  Causes  from  Powers, 4.  Throughout  this  essay  I  use  the  terms 
‘tendency’  and ‘inclination’  as  synonymous,  without  denying that  in  common 
usage there may be significant differences between them. We often use the word 
tendency purely to name a statistical regularity, whereas ‘inclination’ seems to 
speak more deliberately  of  a  power underlying such regular  occurrences.  For 
some interesting remarks on the use of the term ‘tendency’, see T. S. Champlin 
“Tendencies”,  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1990-91), 119-133. It 
should be noted, however, that the difference between tendency as a statistical 
frequency and tendency as, in Champlin’s words, an “occult causal power” does 
not mean that there is “more than one kind of tendency” (119); it just means 
that  with  the  second  we  attempt  to  provide  an  ontological  account  of  the 
possibility of the former.            
4 All three quotations: Getting Causes from Powers., viii.
B could  be  interrupted,  diverted  or  swamped by  other  factors.  In  this 
everyday fact Mumford and Anjum find grounds for a thesis: “[w]e defend 
the bold thesis”, they write, “that the possibility of prevention leaves no 
room for any kind of necessity in causal production”.5 The possibility of B 
not happening because it is prevented by C or D means that no necessity 
– logical, metaphysical or physical – is to be found in the causal process. A 
can be  sufficient  for  the  production  of  B,  without  it  being  a  sufficient 
condition of B, precisely because external factors can intervene to prevent 
the occurrence of B.
Here I do not assess Mumford and Anjum’s defence and development 
of this claim with their ‘antecedent strengthening’ logical test for causal 
necessity and by modelling what they take to be the polygenic nature of 
causal processes by means of vectors.6 My focus is solely on the idea of 
tendency or inclination that they contrast with necessitation. This contrast 
within a theory of causation is one that they inherit from a tradition going 
back  to  J.S.  Mill  at  least,  who  claimed  that  “all  laws  of  causation,  in 
consequence of their liability to be counteracted, require to be stated in 
words affirmative of tendencies only, and not of actual results”, and that 
“if it were stated to be a law of nature, that all heavy bodies fall to the 
ground, it would probably be said that the resistance of the atmosphere, 
which prevents a balloon from falling, constitutes the balloon an exception 
to that pretended law of nature. But the real law is, that all heavy bodies 
5 Getting Causes from Powers, 53.
6 For discussion of the logical test, see E. J. Lowe, “Mumford and Anjum on causal 
necessitarianism and antecedent strengthening”, Analysis 72(4): 731-735, and of 
Mumford and Anjum’s use of vectors, see Troy Cross’s NDPR review of Mumford 
and Anjum’s 2010 contribution to  The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding 
and  Manifestation.  ed.  A.  Marmodoro  (London:  Routledge): 
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/31889-the-metaphysics-of-powers-their-grounding-and-
their-manifestations-2/, and Luke Glynn’s review of Getting Causes from Powers 
in Mind 121 (484):1099-1106.
tend to fall”.7 This venerable lineage does not, of course, relieve Mumford 
and Anjum of the obligation to clarify what they mean by ‘tendency’. Their 
anti-necessitarian  arguments,  however,  tell  us  nothing  about  what  the 
purported dispositional modality ‘actually’ is. They say only what it is not. 
The  idea  of  a  disposition  tending  towards  its  manifestation,  its  being 
inclined  towards  that  manifestation,  is  conceived  merely  negatively  in 
relation to necessity: a tendency is a power that does not necessitate its 
manifestation,  and  it  does  not  because  another  outcome  is  always 
possible. Moreover, when Mumford and Anjum attempt to show that the 
possibility of a power’s manifestation is more than one possibility amongst 
a potentially infinite number of equals, more than a mere abstract logical 
or  metaphysical  possibility,  they  do  so  only  in  terms  of  statistical 
regularities and probability: dispositions are “reliable, tend to manifest” 
and “disposed to happen with a non-negligible probability”.8 With their 
‘dispositional  modality’,  then,  Mumford  and  Anjum  are  offering  a 
propensity  theory of  probability  without  saying anything positive about 
what propensities or tendencies are.9 In the end, it is only because they 
attempt to explain causation with a realist theory of powers that they can 
claim that their anti-necessitarian arguments about causation justify their 
ontological and modal innovation; if powers, understood as real characters 
of  things,  explain  causation  understood as  irreducible  to  necessitation, 
7 J. S. Mill, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive (1872), Book III, ch. 10, 
§5, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1973), vol. VII, 445, and “On the Definition of Political Economy 
and on the Method of Investigation Proper to It” in Collected Works, vol. IV, 309-
99, 337.
8 Getting Causes from Powers, 181.
9  For a survey of different forms of the propensity interpretation of probability, 
see Donald Gillies, ‘Varieties of Propensity’, British Journal for the Philosophy of  
Science 51 (2000), 807-835.
then powers themselves must have a modal value other than necessity. 
Nevertheless, at this stage of their argument, the idea of the dispositional 
modality is merely an inference, and an inability to say anything positive 
about what is being inferred might lead us to question what motivates the 
inference,  namely  the  explanation  of  causation  in  terms  of  a  power 
realism.
Mumford  and  Anjum  openly  discuss  the  problem  of  what  we  can 
meaningfully say about dispositionality, and the problem is all the more 
acute in that, for them, dispositionality is the most primitive or basic form 
of modality in things; it is “the core modality from which the other two 
standard  modal  operators  draw their  sense  as  being  limit  cases  on  a 
spectrum”.  Our  idea  of  natural  possibility  –  as  distinct  from  logical 
possibility – derives from the dispositions that things have, in that for an 
event to be naturally possible, something must have the disposition to 
produce  that  event;  and  when  we  consider  those  dispositions  whose 
manifestation is less and less frequent, then “we reach the idea of a pure 
contingency as an ideal, limiting case”. At the other end of the spectrum, 
our idea of natural necessity – again, as distinct from logical necessity – is 
an “extrapolation” from an “idea of what dependably happens with hardly 
any exceptions”,10 and this idea originates in what is disposed or inclined 
to happen. 
How, then, to say something concrete and positive about what this 
primary  and  sui  generis  dispositional  modality  ‘actually’  is?  Getting 
Causes from Powers addresses this question head-on with the claim that 
dispositionality  is  a  primitive  concept  –  primitive  in  the  sense  of  un-
analysable – known directly from experience; known not from the objects 
of experience, but rather from our own exercise and experience of power. 
There is, first, a direct experience of power in agency, and, second, this 
power is not necessity but rather the dispositional modality. With the first 
claim Mumford and Anjum aim – and this is a project they share with a 
10 All three quotations, Getting Causes from Powers, 182.
variety  of  recent  philosophers11–  to  challenge  David  Hume’s  sceptical 
arguments concerning the experience of causal power in agency. All we 
experience  in  agency,  Hume  claims,  is  the  constant  conjunction  of  a 
volition with a  physical  movement that  succeeds that  volition,  and we 
have no internal impression of an apparent energy or force connecting 
them – but this sceptical position is built on an “implausible” separation of 
volition  and  agency  that  a  “reunificationist”  account  of  agency  can 
overturn.12
There is, for Mumford and Anjum, a simultaneity of volition and act, 
and not a precedence of the one in relation to the other. When you will to 
raise  your  arm,  it  is  not  that  “you  will  to  raise  your  arm,  and  then, 
sometime later, your arm rises. The temporal priority condition loses all 
credibility here”. Wishing to act, in the sense of idle thinking about acting, 
can  certainly  precede  the  act,  but  genuine  willing,  they  hold,  is 
simultaneous with the bodily movement, and need not “be … a distinct 
and  observable  mental  episode”.13 In  the  experience  of  resistance  – 
however slight that resistance may be – there is an experience of force or 
active power, and not just of a conjunction of discrete events; activity and 
passivity,  force  and  resistance  are  inseparable.  Our  sense  of 
proprioception – a sense of effort irreducible to the other five senses – 
shows,  Mumford  and  Anjum  contend,  that  the  two  are  “integrated 
closely”, such that they are no ordinary, separable relata: lifting an empty 
box that I thought was heavy my body adjusts itself immediately to the 
amount of effort required in order to meet the resistance. Here “the willing 
11 Their list of 20th-century philosophers includes Martin Heidegger, Brian 
O’Shaughnessy and Tom Baldwin; see Getting Causes from Powers, 205.
12 Both quotations: Getting Causes from Powers, 204.
13 Getting Causes from Powers, 206.
and the movements … must be an entirely integrated process. It could not 
be, for instance, that the volition has already been and gone. One could 
not successfully act it out, if it had, because it is only once one has the 
proprioceptive information available that one knows exactly what must be 
done”.14
These  remarks  about  agency  and  proprioception  deserve 
development, but their claim that there is a direct experience of force or 
power in agency leads to the further claim that this force or power is a sui 
generis  form of modality. Any one of my powers has a “limited class of 
outcomes,  out  of  all  those  that  are  merely  possible”,15 and  yet  the 
realisation  of  a  member  of  this  particular  class  of  outcomes  is  not 
necessary,  precisely because any power can be defeated or prevented 
from manifesting itself. When, to take their – to varying degrees surreal – 
examples, I try to push over a well-built wall or “resist the power of an 
oncoming train”, our experience shows us that “we do not have enough 
power to overcome some obstacle. Such an experience does not illustrate 
causal necessitation”.16 Things only tend to fall over when I push them, 
and it is in this experience of tendency apparently common to us all that 
we  experience  the  dispositional  modality:  “our  actions  only  dispose  or 
tend towards  their  outcomes,  never  guaranteeing them,  and everyone 
knows what this means”.17 
14 Both quotations: Getting Causes from Powers, 208-209.
15 Getting Causes from Powers, 210.
16 Here it becomes clear that Mumford and Anjum are imagining experiences in 
order to defend an already prepared thesis, rather than drawing a thesis from 
attention to experience.  
17 Getting Causes from Powers, 210.
Now,  even  if  we  are  sympathetic  to  Mumford  and  Anjum’s 
reunificationist  sketch of  agency,  and accept  that  there is  some direct 
experience  of  force  in  voluntary  action,  this  appeal  to  the  allegedly 
obvious fact of the dispositional modality is hardly convincing. It is hard to 
see  how  the  appeal  to  the  defeasibility  of  intentions  provides  what 
Mumford and Anjum are explicitly  looking for:  an account  of  what  the 
dispositional modality  is rather than what it  is not. We remain with the 
idea  that  the  dispositional  modality  is  dispositional  because  the 
manifestation does not have to occur and because it will to some degree 
probably occur. Certainly, now Mumford and Anjum claim that we have 
direct epistemological  access to a principle that underlies and grounds 
statistical  regularity:  we  somehow  “perceive”  or  “experience”18 the 
dispositional modality in our actions, we perceive our intentions tending to 
be realised. Yet there is still no positive description of what this perception 
or experience is; each time they attempt to say what it is, they say only 
what it is not. Notwithstanding their appeal to the obvious, and for all that 
they claim that the dispositional modality is “the modality with which we 
are most familiar”19, Mumford and Anjum’s idea of tendency or inclination 
– i.e. of dispositionality – remains without positive content. Consequently, 
they  seem  unable  to  provide  a  convincing  response  to  the  Humean 
objection that the only thing I experience concerning the realisation of my 
intentions is the external result of my action. It is plausible that I have a 
sense that my intended outcome may not be realised only because I know 
my  intentions  have  in  the  past  occasionally  been  defeated,  and  only 
18 Chapter 9 of Getting Causes from Powers is entitled ‘Perceiving Causes’, and 
it  contains  a  three-page  section  entitled  “Perception  and  the  Dispositional 
Modality” but how exactly this ‘proprioceptive’ perception differs from external 
sensory perception is never clearly spelled out.
19 Getting Causes from Powers, 212.
because of a customary association of the present with the past. Pointing 
to a supposedly obvious immediate experience that, in the end, has no 
positive content, hardly represents a successful way of challenging such a 
position.
2. Necessity in Maine de Biran’s Reunificationist Account of Agency 
Mumford  and  Anjum  claim  that  their  ‘reunificationist’  conception  of 
agency develops a long tradition going back to Locke, without mentioning 
Pierre Maine de Biran, whose work in the first decades of the nineteenth 
century  represents  one  of  the  richest  moments  of  this  tradition.  Like 
Mumford and Anjum, Biran argues that we have a direct experience of 
force in agency whilst criticising Hume’s sceptical arguments, and yet for 
him the force in agency is still a matter of necessity. Here I present briefly 
the  main  elements  of  Biran’s  critique  of  Hume’s  sceptical  position  on 
agency in the first Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding as a way of 
illuminating  the  French  philosopher’s  own  conception  of  necessity  in 
agency.
Biran’s  critique of  Hume initially  appears  in  his  prize-winning  1807 
work De l’aperception immédiate (On Immediate Apperception), at a time 
when he was just coming into his own as a philosopher.20 Biran takes up 
several points of Hume’s argument in Section VII of the Enquiry in order to 
20 In 1817 Biran published – and this is one of the few texts that he did publish – 
a  longer  response  to  Hume  as  an  appendix  to  the  Examen  des  Leçons  de 
philosophie de M. Laromiguière. This essay (“Opinion de Hume sur la nature et 
l’origine de la notion de causalité”) is contained in Maine de Biran, Oeuvres vol. 
XI-2,  Commentaires et marginalia;  dix-huitième siècle,  ed.  B.  Baertschi,  Paris: 
Vrin, 1993, 37-49, together with a later, more developed draft of it (“Examen des 
doutes de Hume sur l’idée de pouvoir, d’énergie et de liason nécessaire, et sur 
l’origine que peut avoir cette idée dans le sentiment interne de l’effort, ou du 
pouvoir efficace de la volonté dans les mouvements du corps”, 3-31). Below I 
refer to the 1807 reading and to this later of the two essays. On Biran’s response 
to  Hume,  see also  Jean  Pucelle,  ‘Maine  de Biran  critique de  Hume:  essai  de 
philosophie comparée’, Hume Studies VI/1 (1980), 45-60.
unveil and attack the presuppositions that underlie it.21 First, Hume sets 
up his sceptical analysis by arguing that the fact that the “motion follows 
the command of the will  is a matter of common experience, like other 
natural events”.22 Hume considers inner experience, that is, the relation of 
the will to the body, on the model of outer experience and the relations 
between  objects.  This,  Biran  argues,  is  a  ‘naturalistic’,  unjustified 
presupposition that deforms the entirety of Hume’s analysis; the relation 
between the will and a resistant term is certainly a fact, but it is not of 
“the  same  order  as  the  other  operations  of  external  nature”.23 The 
difference between inner and outer experience is, for Biran, radical, and 
conscious experience must be considered from a genuinely first-person 
perspective. Experience reveals that the most fundamental or ‘primitive 
fact  [fait  primitif]’  of  consciousness  is  the  unity  in  duality  of  will  and 
resistance: will is what it is only in relation to resistance, and vice versa. 
This peculiar dual fact of effort is ‘primitive’ or basic, according to Biran’s 
voluntarist psychology, in the sense that it is the measure and extent of 
all  consciousness;  we are conscious only  insofar  as  we are making an 
effort,  however minimal and merely mental than effort may be. Yet we 
know of the ‘fact’ of effort, we are self-consciousness, not by means of 
21 On Hume’s increasing concern with human agency as a possible origin of the 
idea of  power in the  Treatise,  its Abstract,  its Appendix and then in the first 
Enquiry, see,  for  example,  Joshua  M.  Wood,  “Hume  and  the  Metaphysics  of 
Agency”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 52/1 (2014) 87-112, 88.
22 I  refer  to  Tom Beauchamp’s  2000  edition  of  Hume’s  Enquiry  Concerning 
Human Understanding  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press)  with the abbreviation 
EHU followed by the chapter number and paragraph number. Here: EHU 7.10.
23 “That this is a fact is quite enough for us; but it is a fact of experience of the 
same order as the other operations of an external nature. I deny the equivalence. 
It is precisely this, it seems to me, that is the source of all those illusions that give 
heart  to  the  sceptics”;  Oeuvres  vol.  IV,  De  l’aperception  immédiate,  ed.  I. 
Radrizzani (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 119.
perception, or by ‘common experience’ in Hume’s terms, but rather by an 
‘immediate apperception’, a form of awareness that is wholly different to 
objective knowledge.
Second, concerning the “influence of volitions over the organs of the 
body” Hume writes that “this influence … can never be foreseen from any 
apparent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the effect, 
and  renders  the  one  an  infallible  consequence  of  the  other”.24 The 
argument, in separating volition from the ‘consequent’ movement, is that 
we  have  no  experience  of  a  causal  relation  or  necessary  connexion 
underlying the temporal succession of the two terms. Yet, for Biran, “the 
relation of  causality is completely different to that of  succession”,25 and 
the  presupposition  that  causality,  if  it  exists,  must  be  a  matter  of 
succession is  another  unjustifiable  motivation  for  the scepticism Hume 
seems to profess. The causal force or power in our action is not prior to 
the effect, but is rather present in it: “the internal energy of the cause is 
directly  felt  (sentie)  in  the  effect  or  the  movement  produced”.26 Biran 
shares with Mumford and Anjum, then, the idea that causation is not a 
matter of succession but rather simultaneity.27
24 EHU 7.10. 
25 De l’aperception immédiate, 117.
26 De l’aperception immediate, 119.
27 It should be noted, however, that Mumford and Anjum claim (Getting Causes 
from Powers,  ch.  5)  that this simultaneity also characterises causation in the 
objects of experience, whereas Biran maintains the Humean position according 
to which worldly processes are successive and that there is no force, power or 
necessity to be found in them.
Third,  Hume  holds  that  “we  are  so  far  from  being  immediately 
conscious” of how the mind affects the body “that it must forever escape 
our most diligent enquiry”.28 We know neither why only some of our bodily 
organs can be directed by the ‘soul’, nor how the soul affects the parts 
that  it  can  direct,  particularly  when we  consider  what  “we  learn  from 
anatomy”,  namely  “that  the  immediate  object  of  power  in  voluntary 
motion is not the member itself which is moved, but certain muscles, and 
nerves, and animal spirits, and, perhaps, something still more minute and 
unknown”.29 We might  think we feel  an immediate power to move our 
limbs, but in physiological reality our will does not have to act on the limb 
as a whole,  but rather on a host of  intermediaries,  beginning with the 
brain – and we have no immediate knowledge of this in experience. Biran 
responds first by attacking the claim that we have to know how the will 
moves the body in order for us to know that it moves the body.30 We may 
as  well  claim,  Biran  argues,  that  we  can  see  only  if  we  know  the 
physiological  processes  according  to  which  we  see,  which  is  absurd. 
Moreover,  to  know  and  explain  how  the  soul  moves  the  body  would 
amount  to  presenting  an  “external  image  or  representation”31 of  the 
28 EHU, 7.10.
29 EHU, 7.14.
30 When  Edward  Craig  holds  that  with  this  argument  Hume  employs  a 
“gratuitously strong condition” (“The Idea of Necessary Connexion” in  Reading 
Hume on Human Understanding, ed. P. Millican, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002, 211-29, 216) for the possibility of discovering power in voluntary agency, 
he  echoes  Biran’s  claim  that  what  Hume  “advances  in  the  form  of  an 
incontestable  argument is  a  purely  gratuitous hypothesis”  (Oeuvres  vol.  XI-2, 
Commentaires et marginalia; dix-huitième siècle, 7).    
31 Oeuvres vol. XI-2, Commentaires et marginalia; dix-huitième siècle, 7.
relation  of  two separate  entities  –  and  such  picture  thinking  can  only 
obscure  the  primitive,  inexplicable  fact  of  voluntary  consciousness  as 
given in immediate apperception. It also obscures the primary nature of 
the human body: when moving my arm, Biran argues, I do indeed will to 
move my arm and act directly upon it; but this arm is not the physiological 
object the doctor examines, but rather my arm as belonging to  le corps 
propre, to my own body, to my pre-objective body of which I am aware in 
internal apperception.
The basic position of Maine de Biran’s philosophy, then, one that he 
will  rework and refine in several failed attempts to write a masterwork 
over the next two decades, is this: there is an immediate apperception of 
power in its unity with resistance, and the primary resistant term is not 
the body as anatomical object, but rather the body as  le corps propre. 
Accordingly, when Hume concludes that “our idea of power is not copied 
from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when we 
give rise to animal motion,  or apply our limbs to their proper use and 
office”,  Biran responds that he is  insufficiently  attentive to experience, 
and, in the end, denying an evident fact.32 Untested presuppositions and 
naturalistic theories have occluded the unity – a peculiar unity in duality – 
of agency. 
For all that it is ‘reunificationist’, this appeal to experience certainly 
differs from Mumford and Anjum’s in that Biran is more ready to develop 
the  epistemological  and  ontological  implications  of  a  non-separatist 
conception  of  agency.  Yet,  as  I  have  indicated,  there  is  a  more 
fundamental difference in their positions, since Biran explicitly argues that 
32 EHU 7.15. Ultimately, such a denial cannot be met with an argument, as Biran 
will write in the Essai sur les fondements de la psychologie, written and re-written 
in the second and third decades of the century: “What should we say to someone 
who denies a visible or tangible fact? Perhaps nothing. We should only make him 
see or touch what he denies, and if he persists in saying that his senses lead him 
into error, all discussion will end there”; Maine de Biran,  Oeuvres vol. VII,  Essai 
sur les fondements de la psychologie, ed. F. C. T. Moore, Paris: Vrin, 2001, 165.
the force of the will in its unity with resistance is a matter of necessity: 
“the  only  necessary  relation  (liaison)  is  that  which  primitively  occurs 
between a living force and a resistance or inertia”.33 The claim is that in 
the exercise of the will we have a direct apprehension of an a posteriori  
necessity. Certainly, within the unity in duality of will and resistance, the 
necessity is  not a necessary  connexion –  but,  for  Biran,  it  is  necessity 
none the less: when I am willing to raise my arm, my arm  by necessity 
rises. Mumford and Anjum would object that someone may have placed a 
straightjacket on me in my sleep, or that I may be standing in a gale, and 
thus my arm will not move in the way I intended. Yet, for Biran, if there is 
resistance, my effort will necessarily be having some effect, even if, from 
the outside, that effect is merely microscopic.
Of  course,  the  cases  of  paralysis  and  phantom  limbs  that  Hume 
invokes in the  Enquiry may seem to represent counter-examples to this 
thesis:
A man, suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm, or who had 
newly lost those members, frequently endeavours, at first to move 
them, and employ them in their usual offices. Here he is as much 
conscious of power to command such limbs, as a man in perfect 
health is conscious of power to actuate any member which remains 
in  its  natural  state  and  condition.  But  consciousness  never 
deceives. Consequently, neither in the one case nor in the other, 
are we ever conscious of any power. We learn the influence of our 
will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us, how 
one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in the 
secret  connexion,  which binds them together,  and renders  them 
inseparable.34
Biran denies, however, that what we describe “only in an improper sense” 
as the ‘endeavours’, i.e.  the ‘efforts’  of the paralysed person to move, 
“are determined in the same way and by the same immediate principle as 
33 De l’aperception immédiate, 120.
34 EHU, 7.13.
before the loss of the member or of its use […]”. They are not determined 
by the same principle because “there is here rather a desire to move than 
an explicit act of will, and there is no real power exercised or felt”;35 in 
these cases, there is no willing or volition present at all. The paralysed 
person can wish or desire to move her arm, but not will to do it – and the 
apparent feeling of his command over the limb is merely a function of 
memory and thus wholly different to the apperception of force in actual 
effort.36 It  is  perhaps  not  “implausible  to  claim  that  someone  in  such 
circumstances  could  have an experience of volition”,37 but, from Biran’s 
perspective, it possesses this veneer of plausibility only on the grounds of 
a ‘separatist’  and successive conception of  agency. Once we recognise 
that the will is what it is only insofar as it meets resistance in movement, 
the idea that the paralysed person wills to move her arm becomes much 
more questionable.
Maine de Biran, in any case, sees necessity, but Mumford and Anjum 
tendency or inclination, in a reunificationist account of agency. How would 
the French philosopher respond to Mumford and Anjum’s appeal to the 
phenomena of failure and prevention, to the defeasibility of intentions? It 
seems clear that he would object that Mumford and Anjum have failed to 
35 Commentaires et marginalia, Oeuvres vol. XI-2, ed. C. Frémont (Paris: Vrin, 
1993), 11-12.
36 Anna Devarieux (L’individualité persévérante Grenoble: Millon, 2004, 60) is 
right to takes issue with F. C. T. Moore’s claim that this aspect of Biran’s response 
to Hume is “lamentably obscure” (The Psychology of Maine de Biran,  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1970, 97).
37 Joshua  M.  Wood,  ‘Hume  and  the  Metaphysics  of  Agency’,  101.  Wood  is 
concerned simply “to establish that there is  some  merit to Hume’s claim that 
volition and action are  separable”  (96),  rather  than to defeat  the arguments 
offered  by  philosophers  including  Mumford  and  Anjum  (to  whom  he  refers) 
against Hume’s sceptical analysis.
recognise  “what  distinguishes  the  primitive  facts  furnished  by  inner 
experience  from  the  secondary  or  derived  facts  that  habit  alone  or 
repeated induction can erect as laws of nature”.38 The realisation of my 
intentions, as Hume had already argued, is a matter of external fact, a 
matter  of  objective  experience,  and  I  have  a  sense  of  whether  my 
intention is likely to be realised only through having tried such a thing in 
the past. In any action, my intention, of course, may fail – but this takes 
nothing away from the primary or primitive necessity of my will having an 
immediate effect on my body. Playing pool, I intend to pot the black, and if 
I am in the habit of playing, then it is, perhaps, likely but by no means 
certain that I will succeed; but If I do try to pot the black, i.e. if there is 
effort,  my will  necessarily has an effect on my body. That is, Maine de 
Biran helps us to see that Mumford and Anjum base their analysis on a 
secondary  phenomenon  that  is  given  only  in  objective  or  ‘external’ 
experience.  Small  wonder,  then,  that  their  claims  concerning  a  direct 
experience of the dispositional modality in the experience of agency are 
hardly convincing – they attempt to persuade us that we have an inner, 
proprioceptive experience of an aspect of action that is only given in outer 
experience.  In  short,  Mumford  and  Anjum  make  an  illegitimate, 
unjustifiable  claim  about  the  dispositional  modality  by  passing  over  a 
more  fundamental  or  primitive  modality  of  powers.  One  could  put  the 
problem this way: I can fail to realise my intentions, but I cannot fail to will 
what I will.
    
3. Ravaisson on Habit as a Disposition
In no way do I pretend, here, to have shown that Maine de Biran offers 
decisive and definitive arguments against Hume’s sceptical construal of 
agency. My aspiration stretches no further than to have shown, with Maine 
de  Biran,  that  the  defeasibility  of  intentions  has  no  bearing  on  the 
38 Biran, Oeuvres vol. XI-2, Commentaires et marginalia; dix-huitième siècle, 8.
primary, original modal value of voluntary action. Now, if this were the 
only way in which nineteenth-century French philosophy was relevant for 
our purposes, we would be led to the wholly negative response that in 
action there is no direct experience of inclination or tendency, of any kind 
of dispositional modality irreducible to necessity and possibility. However, 
in the work of Félix Ravaisson, Maine de Biran’s principal successor and 
inheritor in the ‘spiritualist’ tradition of French philosophy, we find grounds 
for a more positive response to Mumford and Anjum’s claims. For in his 
1838 De l’habitude Ravaisson argues that there is a direct experience of 
tendency  or  inclination  –  a  direct  experience,  thus,  of  a  ‘dispositional 
modality’. Yet this experience is not available in purely voluntary action, 
Ravaisson argues, but rather in the principle that we have just seen Biran 
invoke, in a Humean fashion,  to account  for the origin of  our  ideas of 
‘laws’ of nature, namely habit.
Of  course,  the idea  that  an account  of  inclination  as  irreducible  to 
causal necessity can be gained from an analysis of habit, and motor habits 
in particular, may seem counter-intuitive. If, as is often the case in modern 
philosophy, we think of acquired habits as mechanical and lifeless – as, in 
Henri Bergson’s memorable phrase, the fossilised residue of a spiritual  
activity –  then nothing would seem to separate habit from the apparent 
necessity  of  mechanical  causation.39 Yet  it  is  precisely  this  classically 
modern  conception  of  habit  as  a  mechanical  principle  of  action  that 
Ravaisson  opposes.  A  physical  action  –  say,  learning  how  to  drive  or 
pronounce the words of a foreign language – by means of its repetition, 
becomes, as Ravaisson characteristically puts it,  less and less voluntary, 
less and less deliberate and conscious. It does not, for all that, “become 
the mechanical effect of an external impulse, but rather the effect of an 
39 Henri Bergson, “La vie et l’oeuvre de Ravaisson” in La pensée et le mouvant, 
Oeuvres  (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), 253-291, 267. On the 
basis of this phrase Bergson substantially misinterprets Ravaisson’s thinking; on 
this  point  see  Dominique  Janicaud,  Ravaisson  et  la  métaphysique:  une 
généalogie du spiritualisme français (Paris: Vrin, 1997).
inclination that follows from the will”.40 The acquisition of a motor habit 
does  not  consist  in  the  transformation  of  an  originally  voluntary 
movement  into  a  dead  mechanism;  it  rather  involves  more  of  the 
movement becoming  inclined. It is not even the case – as we might be 
tempted to think – that more and more parts of the movement become 
mechanical, and that more and more of a movement escapes voluntary 
control; it is rather that more and more of the movement takes on a life of 
its  own,  a  life  or  spontaneity  that  is  continuous  with  rather  than 
antithetical to voluntary decision. This life or spontaneity is precisely what 
Ravaisson thinks of as inclination or tendency, as a pre-theoretical – or 
post-theoretical – orientation to goals or possibilities that were previously 
posited in reflective consciousness.41
An acquired habit is not merely a “state”, as Ravaisson announces in 
the introduction to his work, but “a disposition, a virtue”, and the idea of a 
disposition is here thought in an active, tendential sense.42 An acquired 
habit tends towards, is inclined towards its manifestations, and although 
Ravaisson  does  not  explicitly  write  of  a  ‘dispositional  modality’,  he 
certainly  aims  to  elucidate  the  nature  of  tendency  or  inclination  by 
distinguishing  its  modal  status  from traditional  ideas  of  necessity  and 
possibility. If habitual inclination can be understood in terms of possibility, 
then rather than an intellectual conception of possibility as conceivability, 
40 Ravaisson, Of Habit, 55.
41 Ravaisson does not deny that some habits – particularly bad habits – can be 
acquired without first being fully conscious and deliberate acts. His descriptions 
of habits beginning with consciously posited and explicit goals is a function of his 
concern to reveal how habit is continuous with the will and consciousness, but 
these  descriptions  do  not  amount  to  the  assertion  that  habits  have  to  be 
acquired  in  this  way.  Morally  speaking,  however,  Ravaisson  may  well  be  too 
optimistic  about  the  role  of  habit  in  the  good  life.  On  this  point,  see  Clare 
Carlisle,  “Between  Freedom and  Necessity:  Félix  Ravaisson  on  Habit  and  the 
Moral Life”, Inquiry 53/2 (2010) 123-145.
inclinations  are  a  matter  of  possibility  in  this  sense  having  become 
incorporated or realised:
In reflection and will, the end of movement is an idea, an ideal to 
be accomplished … It is a possibility to be realised. But as the end 
becomes fused with the movement, and the movement with the 
tendency, possibility, the ideal is realised in it.43
A habit as a disposition has, as Mumford and Anjum would say, a limited 
class of outcomes, and so these outcomes are not simply possible in any 
typical  sense  of  logical  possibility  or  even  of  ‘real’  or  ‘metaphysical’ 
possibility.  Yet  Ravaisson attempts  to  account  for  this  limited sense of 
possibility  in  terms  of  a  vital  spontaneity,  obscure  activity  –  obscure 
because  no  longer  fully  conscious  –  or  desire  that  is  realised  in  the 
habitual movement and, thus, in the habitual agent. In the acquisition of a 
motor habit, “inclinations … become more and more the form, the way of 
being,  even  the  very  being  of  those  organs”  used  to  perform  the 
movement; the “spontaneity of desire is dispersed in some way … within 
the indeterminate multiplicity of the organism.”44
42 Ravaisson, Of Habit, 25. In a recent essay concerning, principally, Aquinas and 
Leibniz,  Paul  Hoffman  (“Reasons,  Causes,  and  Inclinations”  in  Emotion  and 
Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early-Modern Philosophy,  eds. M. Pickavé and L. 
Shapiro,  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2012,  156-175)  has  attempted  to 
distinguish inclinations from habits: “I am tempted … to conclude that we should 
not  think  of  inclinations,  as  the  term  is  used  by  these  philosophers,  to  be 
dispositions or habits to act in a certain way. That is, they are not like being 
soluble  or  like being a smoker.  Instead we should think of  them as incipient 
actions  or  movements  that  will  have  a  certain  outcome  unless  something 
intervenes.” (161). Yet the example of smoking hardly serves the purposes of 
this  tendentiously  non-tendential  interpretation  of  dispositions  and habits,  for 
faced with cigarettes, a smoker, it seems clear, will smoke unless something else 
comes to intervene, namely the will.
43 Of Habit, 55.
44 Of Habit, 57.
Concerning necessity, Ravaisson writes:
habit is not an external necessity of constraint, but a necessity of 
attraction and desire. It is, indeed, a law, a law of the limbs, which 
follows on from the freedom of spirit. But this law is a law of grace. 
It is the final cause that increasingly predominates over efficient 
causality and which absorbs the latter into itself. And at that point, 
indeed, the end and the principle, the fact and the law, are fused 
together within necessity.45  
An acquired habit,  on this account, is  not something external to me, a 
principle  wholly  independent of  the will,  and thus what  we might  call, 
faute de mieux, the ‘necessity’ in the force of habit is not the iron rule of 
mechanical necessity. It is the incorporation of a purpose or final cause 
into nature, a nature that becomes the ‘second nature’ of the habitual 
agent.  Thus,  as  Ravaisson  puts  it  in  a  sentence  that  responds  to 
traditional ideas of both necessity and possibility, habit is “at once active 
and  passive,  equally  opposed  to  mechanical  Fatality  and  to  reflective 
Freedom”.46
Although  Ravaisson  does  not  explicitly  discuss  a  form  of  modality 
irreducible to any idea of necessity or possibility, it does no violence to his 
thinking to see in it a conception of what Mumford and Anjum termed a 
‘dispositional modality’ – a dispositional modality that is given directly in 
experience.  Maine de Biran had argued that  in  effort  there is  a  direct 
apperception  of  the  force  of  the  will  in  its  unity  with  resistance;  and 
Ravaisson develops Biran’s position by arguing that in the decline of effort 
in the acquisition of a habit there is an apperception of this voluntary force 
becoming  less  and  less  voluntary,  and  more  and  more  spontaneous.47 
45 Of Habit, 55.
46 Of Habit, 55.
47 Ravaisson develops Biran’s own tentative hypotheses about the principle of 
habit as an ‘obscure activity’, some of which he added to his early prize-winning 
dissertation on the  Influence sur l’habitude sur la faculté de penser  before its 
Certainly, this development of Biran’s argument involves a methodological 
difficulty,  for  it  involves  the  attempt  to  describe  within  conscious 
philosophical  reflection  that  which  by  its  nature  begins  to  transcend 
conscious  awareness,  namely  inclination.  Yet  Ravaisson appeals  to  our 
experience  of  becoming habituated,  of  becoming inclined,  as  an 
experience  wherein  we at  least  glimpse  a  kind  of  vital  spontaneity  of 
inclination  that  is  continuous  with  the  will  and  consciousness.  It  is 
precisely this experience that, Ravaisson argues, both ‘intellectualist’ and 
‘realist’ or physiological interpretations of habit acquisition are unable to 
account for.48
Moreover, Mumford and Anjum’s idea that the dispositional modality 
forms  a  spectrum  accommodating  material,  de  re  necessity  and  real 
possibility is not foreign to Ravaisson’s thinking: the modality of tendency 
or  inclination,  he  argues,  is  primary  in  that  it  forms  a  continuum 
underlying  ideas  of  mechanical  necessity  and  pure  contingency.  Motor 
habits can become less and less voluntary,  less and less conscious, only 
because there exists an infinitely graduated scale between the freedom of 
thought and will and the apparent inertia of body. The experience of habit 
acquisition is the experience of degrees of freedom and voluntary activity 
according to a continuum – that Ravaisson names ‘desire’ – underlying our 
abstract  oppositions  of  reflective  thought  to  extended  matter.  Hence 
publication in 1802, and which are missing from the English translation. On this 
development  see  Chapter  1  of  Dominique  Janicaud,  Ravaisson  et  la 
métaphysique.   
48 Ravaisson’s  attempt  to  steer  between  ‘intellectualist’  and  ‘realist’  or 
physiological accounts of motor habit acquisition will, of course, be taken up by 
later French thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty. Yet although it is certainly the case 
that  Merleau-Ponty  appeals  in  the  phenomena  of  habit  “to  a  kind  of 
understanding or  know-how located in  the body that  is  outside the space of 
reasons and outside the realm of mechanical causes”, as Paul Hoffman puts it 
(“Reasons, Causes and Inclinations”, 158), this does not directly involve an idea – 
Ravaisson’s idea – of habit as inclination or tendency.
Ravaisson can claim that reflection on habit is an essential philosophical 
method,  “the only real  method … for  the estimation,  by a  convergent 
infinite series, of the relation, real in itself, but incommensurable in the 
understanding,  of  Nature  and  Will”.49  Our  idea  of  a  pure,  mechanical 
nature and a pure will are merely ideas deriving from the experience of a 
continuum that can never descend into absolute mechanical necessity.
This applies not just to human nature but to nature as a whole, and 
Ravaisson  also  shares  with  Mumford  and  Anjum  the  idea  that 
psychological  reflection  can  offer  a  guiding  thread  for  a  general 
metaphysics; by the “most powerful of analogies” we can deduce that the 
continuum underlying the relation of mind to body is present throughout 
nature as a whole. Tendency or inclination is present in the natural world 
from the ground up; what might look like dead mechanical necessity at 
the lowest levels of inanimate nature is – according to Ravaisson’s activist 
and Leibnizian interpretation of inertia50 – still an expression of inclination 
or tendency. In this way, reflection on habit allows Ravaisson to claim that 
“the primordial law and the most general form of being is the tendency of 
persevere  in  the  very  actuality  that  constitutes  being”.51 Habitual 
tendencies are but a higher, more intelligent expression of this basic law 
of being; and, conversely, on this basis it becomes possible to claim that 
the apparent laws of nature are, in the end, just consolidated habits – and 
this not simply because of how we tend to think about things.
49 Of Habit, 59.
50 In the first  part  of  De l’habitude  Ravaisson offers a general  philosophy of 
nature which begins from the apparently inanimate, inert realm of matter, and 
he attempts here to show how inertia as force is continuous with the force of life 
and thus that it is not simply mechanical.
51 Of Habit, 77.
The parallels  between the respective projects of  Ravaisson and the 
authors of  Getting Causes from Powers, then, are several – and yet they 
are just that, parallels, because Mumford and Anjum advance merely a 
negative  notion  of  tendencies  or  inclinations  in  terms  of  their 
manifestations  not  being  necessary  and  not  just  being  possible,  and 
because they claim to locate a positive experience of  the dispositional 
modality  in  an  aspect  of  agency  of  which  there  is  no  immediate, 
proprioceptive  experience.  Mumford  and  Anjum  are  certainly  right  to 
underline  that  the  dispositional  modality,  if  it  exists,  is  primitive,  sui 
generis  and unanalysable, but Ravaisson, I contend, points us in a more 
convincing way to a positive experience of it. Mumford and Anjum attempt 
to find something positive in failure, but fail to do so, whereas Ravaisson 
points us to a direct experience of being, as it were, carried away by an 
inclination. To be sure, the problem remains of what we can say about this 
positive  experience  of  inclination,  given  its  primitive  and  sui  generis 
nature.  Yet  the  metaphysics  that  Ravaisson  presents  in  Of  Habit – 
particularly  his  ideas  of  the  habituated  body  and  of  the  continuum 
underlying traditional oppositions of mind and body – attempts to render 
intelligible how inclination could be a force that is not a mechanical force, 
a force that may not come to realise itself  for reasons other than that 
another force overcomes it.
To  conclude,  my  argument  concerning  the  claims  of  Mumford  and 
Anjum amounts simply to this: if we want to find a positive experience of a 
dispositional modality irreducible to the traditional modalities of necessity 
and possibility, then we first have to examine our experience of what we 
ordinarily  speak  of  as  tendencies  or  inclinations.  Reflection  on  purely 
voluntary agency will not provide us with what we are looking for. At one 
stage in their argument, Mumford and Anjum do mention action that they 
take  to  be  not  wholly  voluntary.  When  criticising  ‘volitionism’  and  its 
improbable assertion that all my bodily movements – when, for example, 
playing  football  or  driving  a  car  –  are  governed  by  particular  and 
preceding acts of will, they hold that it is not “necessary for an act to be 
intentional”,52 which is to say that in action there is a form of intelligence 
that  cannot  be  reduced  to  explicit  acts  of  the  mind.  Yet  they  do  not 
develop  this  point  by  offering  a  phenomenology  of  skilled  or  habitual 
experience, and they do not illuminate the difference between power or 
capacities in general and tendencies or inclinations in particular.  Yet if, 
following Ravaisson, we begin our inquiries in the metaphysics of powers 
with  inclinations  in  this  narrow sense,  we do not,  to  be sure,  have to 
remain within the confines of a philosophy of only a particular subset of 
powers,  at  least  not  when  we  follow  his  argument  –  one  with  which 
Mumford  and  Anjum  concur  –  that  all  dispositions,  even  the  least 
tendential of capacities, are to some degree a function of being-inclined.
52 Getting Causes from Powers, 205.
